The Petraeus Report
"No Quick Solutions" for Iraq
David Dreshfield
Last Updated: 5/7/08 Section: News
It was the easily one of the most hotly anticipated congressional testimonies in the years of the Bush Administration. General David Petraeus, along with U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, had finally returned from the scorching sands of Iraq to plunge headfirst into the political maelstrom of Capitol Hill. Though Petraeus' major conclusions were more or less entirely leaked ahead of his testimony, it was still a pivotal moment in the continuing debate over the direction of the war in Iraq.
The tone of the report itself is best described as cautiously optimistic. Proponents of the controversial "surge" strategy hailed it as proof of the plan's success, while critics of the surge claimed that the surge had done little besides increase American casualties.
As is typical political matters, the answer lies somewhere in the middle. While Petraeus noted that the surge, along with changes in counterinsurgency tactics, had succeeded in "substantially" reducing the number of deaths from sectarian killings and terrorist attacks, it also admitted, albeit briefly, that the Iraqi government had failed to take advantage of this respite to promote order and sectarian reconciliation.
To be sure, there have been Iraqi successes: Petraeus testified that 95 of the 140 battalions of Iraqi army, police, and special forces personnel are now capable of "operat[ing] with minimal coalition assistance," and the so-called "tribal revolt" in the predominantly Sunni province of Anbar saw a dramatic decline in violence amid a coordinated rejection of terrorist ideologies by Sunni tribal leaders.
However, the rosy assessment that the Sunnis of Anbar have all but thrown themselves at the feet of American troops in a rush of counter-terrorism zeal is erroneous. It is instead far more likely that the Sunni tribal leaders, caught between the strictures of al Qaeda and the sectarian rage of Shia militias, have realized their backs are up against the wall. They are seizing on this alliance of convenience with the Americans in Anbar simply to survive.
The tone of the report itself is best described as cautiously optimistic. Proponents of the controversial "surge" strategy hailed it as proof of the plan's success, while critics of the surge claimed that the surge had done little besides increase American casualties.
As is typical political matters, the answer lies somewhere in the middle. While Petraeus noted that the surge, along with changes in counterinsurgency tactics, had succeeded in "substantially" reducing the number of deaths from sectarian killings and terrorist attacks, it also admitted, albeit briefly, that the Iraqi government had failed to take advantage of this respite to promote order and sectarian reconciliation.
To be sure, there have been Iraqi successes: Petraeus testified that 95 of the 140 battalions of Iraqi army, police, and special forces personnel are now capable of "operat[ing] with minimal coalition assistance," and the so-called "tribal revolt" in the predominantly Sunni province of Anbar saw a dramatic decline in violence amid a coordinated rejection of terrorist ideologies by Sunni tribal leaders.
However, the rosy assessment that the Sunnis of Anbar have all but thrown themselves at the feet of American troops in a rush of counter-terrorism zeal is erroneous. It is instead far more likely that the Sunni tribal leaders, caught between the strictures of al Qaeda and the sectarian rage of Shia militias, have realized their backs are up against the wall. They are seizing on this alliance of convenience with the Americans in Anbar simply to survive.
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Rich D
posted 10/19/07 @ 7:46 PM PST
Nice work, I look forwrad to seeing future articles!
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